Chapter 4: Adapting on the go

Introduction

In the early months of 2020, Singapore had a low number of community infections. We gained an international reputation as one of the few countries that managed to keep a tight lid on the situation. But any confidence we had from our initial success was soon shaken when we were hit with the most daunting challenge in that early stage of our fight against the virus.

There was an outbreak of COVID-19 infections among the migrant workers housed in 43 Purpose-Built Dormitories (PBDs). The 300,000 residents in these dormitories made up the vast majority of the 370,000 work permit holders we had at that time. They were an important part of the workforce in sectors such as construction, shipbuilding and process industries.

There were four COVID-19 cases detected across the 43 PBDs as at 30 March 2020. But just two weeks later, by 16 April 2020, the cases there had increased exponentially to almost 3,000. They accounted for about 70% of the cases nationwide and this put a spotlight on the magnitude of the contagion in the dormitories.

Spike in Singapore's case numbers

Source: MOH COVID-19 Statistics

The first four infections - detected in S11 @ Punggol and Westlite Toh Guan dormitories - had already led to both dormitories being declared as clusters. By 5 April 2020, all their 20,000 residents were under quarantine. It was mind-boggling to think about what would be required to deal with the healthcare crisis that was looming, not to mention the potential economic consequences.

At that time, there was still much about the virus that was not known. No one knew for sure whether asymptomatic people could be infected, or how transmissible or resilient the virus was. What was clear was that it was critically important that the spread of the virus was contained when vaccinations were still not available, and that the migrant workers could still carry out essential work.

With the surge in COVID cases, the PBDs were gazetted as “isolation areas” and the residents placed under quarantine. MOM focused its operations on two areas. First, the raging outbreak in a handful of dormitories had to be contained. Second, migrant workers performing essential services, such as sanitation, logistics and construction had to be moved out of the dormitories to other living quarters so that their work could continue during the “Circuit Breaker”.

Migrant workers being quarantined in a Purpose-Built Dormitory that had been gazetted as an isolation area.

Photo Credit: LTC (RET) Chua Moh Tean Alex

Migrant workers arriving at SAF Tanjong Gul camp.

Source: MINDEF

SAF medical teams doing health checks on migrant workers.

Source: MINDEF

Officers on the ground quickly recognised that something had to be done about accommodation in the dormitories. There was no end to the quarantine in sight and the 300,000 dormitory residents were growing more uneasy and agitated with each passing day. JTF(A) had to work fast if it did not want an eruption of full-blown unrest in the dormitories. The FASTs worked round the clock not only to fight the virus but also to keep the peace in the dormitories.

FAST personnel working hand-in-hand with migrant workers, dormitory operators and healthcare workers to stem the tide of COVID-19 in the dormitories.

Photo Credit: LTC (RET) Chua Moh Tean Alex

JTF(A) touchpoints

The other task force that was set up was the Emergency Housing Task Force (EHTF). Its commander, BG Chua Jin Kiat, Commander 9 Div and Chief Infantry Officer, was given orders to turn vacant SAF camps into accommodation for COVID-free migrant workers who were designated as essential workers. Singapore could not afford to have workers who maintained critical infrastructure and performed daily essential public services quarantined indefinitely. As the COVID-19 cases in the dormitories soared, it was only a matter of time before all migrant workers in the dormitories would get infected if they remained there.

Migrant workers being registered as they moved into temporary housing at SAF camps.

Source: MINDEF

EHTF had to race against time to house the migrant workers in essential services outside the dormitories as speedily as possible. Over the next seven days, it assembled teams comprising commanders and trainers from ground units who had experience enlisting SAF recruits and processing National Servicemen (NSmen) for ICT. Jurong Camp II was ready to receive the first batch of 350 migrant workers within four days. Bedok Camp II also stood up in record time. Within a week of its formation, the EHTF had housed more than 1,700 workers in SAF camps.

Bedok Camp II converted into temporary housing for migrant workers in essential services.

Source: MINDEF

Click HERE to view EHTF personnel in action!

SAF camps housed 17,000 migrant workers working in essential services. 7 SAF camps were repurposed as temporary housing.

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A systems approach to crisis resolution

Having applied the SAF's Mission Analysis processes to the problem, JTF(A) soon came to a worrying conclusion. It was neither sufficient nor sustainable to merely put out fires as they broke out. It was not enough to get through the “Circuit Breaker” with sufficient essential workers. We had to ensure that Singapore could return to a normal state as soon as possible. This meant releasing as many migrant workers as possible back into the workforce, beyond those already identified as essential workers.

This would require a sustainable housing solution for the migrant workers beyond the immediate needs. The community infrastructure which had been locked up as recovery sites had to be released so that both the economy and society could continue to function as normally as possible. Most importantly, we had to avoid overwhelming the healthcare system.

JTF(A) was juggling two balls - committing resources and manpower to contain the spread of the virus in infected dormitories, while investing equal effort to prevent new clusters from emerging in “clean” dormitories. However, the large number of residents and limited testing capacity soon meant that infections were festering undetected in some dormitories. The demand for Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) testing resources quickly far outstripped the supply allocated to JTF(A). The shortage of testing resources meant that the outbreak could well spiral out of control if a solution was not found.

The team returned to the drawing board. Adopting a systems thinking mindset, it mapped out the ecosystem of assets and stakeholders which were both directly and indirectly relevant to the task. This revealed that there were alternative testing resources available at the national level, such as wastewater testing and serology. These were under-utilised because they were relatively less effective in detecting active transmissions. But they could be useful surveillance tools in dormitories where viral transmission was low.

JTF(A) then devised a creative combination of the available testing resources to develop a comprehensive testing regime that could cater to different COVID-19 situations across the dormitories. Those that had more cases were allocated serology tests which could identify recovered and non-infected workers. Dormitories with fewer cases were allocated pooled PCR tests. There was regular testing of wastewater in COVID-free dormitories to provide early warning of contagion.

FAST personnel working alongside healthcare workers to conduct mass testing at a dormitory.

Source: MINDEF

This strategy allowed the JTF(A) to keep a pulse on all dormitories without depleting the limited PCR testing resources. Surges were quickly arrested as they became apparent. This ultimately helped the team to transit from crisis management to crisis resolution. To get to that point required much time to be invested to appreciate the dynamic situation, translate evolving policies into concrete plans, and communicate orders for the deployed forces (FAST, medical and testing teams) to act. It was a demonstration of systems thinking and discipline in executing operations, which are key leadership competencies that the SAF inculcates in every officer, that enabled JTF(A) to look at the problem from a wider perspective and achieve mission success within a matter of months.

Applying the SAF's action learning process to learn on the go

The SAF's instincts of learning on the go to achieve mission outcomes, when there is uncertainty and pressure of time, were put to the test in dealing with COVID-19. The task forces and the officers supporting them responded to the constantly changing situation and accompanying demands by adapting structures, processes, and procedures to new missions as they emerged. This was best illustrated in how the SAF applied the principles underpinning its day-to-day management of tens of thousands of soldiers in routine training and exercises to the management of the migrant workers during the pandemic.

Both task forces identified the need to break down organisational and cultural silos. This was important so that the disparate groups, with the SAF's different ground units working alongside other ministries and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), would be aligned in pursuit of a shared intent and mission and could effectively harness the strengths of inter-agency collaboration.

A multi-agency discussion involving MOM, MOH and the SAF.

Source: MINDEF

The first step they took was to reorganise the numerous agencies under each task force into task-oriented teams. This was adapted from the way that the SAF would employ all its Services and Formations in times of crisis and war. The task forces also carried out the Before Activity Review (BAR) step of the Action Learning Process (ALP) before new tasks were undertaken. In the BAR, lessons learnt from past experiences were factored into the design of the upcoming operation. This contributed to better alignment among the various groups - most evidently in the FAST, which established medical posts with MOH to isolate COVID-19 patients, and transferred close contracts of the patients to quarantine facilities.

Daily DAR session involving FAST personnel and dormitory managers.

Source: MINDEF

Crucially, learning on the go continued as the missions and situations evolved. These were similar to the During Activity Review (DAR) that are typically conducted in the midst of SAF operations, when actions already taken are reviewed to check if they have achieved the original intent and adjustments are made if necessary. The task forces constantly applied the SAF's ALP in their COVID-19 operations, and this helped them stay agile to manage new challenges on the ground.

The Action Learning Process

The Action Learning Process is one of three Leadership Development Processes in the SAF that provide a comprehensive and systematic approach to the design of learning in context. It is a design frame that can be implemented in training, exercises and operations such as during the COVID-19 operations, to support structured conversations and organisational learning. These skills are taught to young leaders in the SAF schools, so that they will be confident to put them into practice when they lead learning and operations in the units.

Making use of battle procedure to gain mission clarity

Numerous points of friction on the ground often made things more complex and inefficient. For instance, soldiers had to make sense of nominal rolls of different versions and formats, provided by 1,140 Factory Converted Dormitories and 168 Construction Temporary Quarters. So the task forces adapted an SAF process, known as the Battle Procedure (BP), to analyse their mission, form a collective appreciation and analysis of the situation at hand, and develop variegated action plans to cater for as many eventualities as possible.

Soldiers had to make sense of nominal rolls of different versions and formats, provided by 43 Purpose-Built Dormitories, 1,140 Factory Converted Dormitories and 168 Construction Temporary Quarters.

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EHTF took a leaf from HQ Infantry and BMTC's expertise in processing thousands of recruits and NSmen at a time, to ensure a smooth flow of migrant workers into the SAF camps. However, the soldiers on the ground found it a challenge to manage the increasing flow of workers, not only because of the numbers but also because they were completely unfamiliar as they had never interacted with migrant workers before.

In-processing migrant workers into their temporary “homes” in SAF camps.

Source: MINDEF

To systematically enhance their processes in managing the migrant workers, EHTF's ground commanders performed a Collective Appreciation of Situation. This review yielded insights into the informal social networks among the migrant workers. EHTF realised that they could work through charismatic and influential leaders among them to perform more effective outreach. In the process, these leaders took ownership of what needed to be done and became powerful advocates of what EHTF wanted done in the dormitories. Through them, EHTF was also able to provide reassurance and a semblance of normalcy to the workers who had suddenly found themselves in new “homes”.

SAF personnel working with migrant worker leaders in the dormitories.

Source: MINDEF

The SAF's operational experience in the dormitories showed that the deliberate application of ALP and BP before, during, and after our operations served us well. These processes ensure that we constantly learn from our experience, anticipate emerging situations, exploit fleeting opportunities, and refine best practices to stay ahead of the curve. They gave the SAF task forces greater capacity to develop more comprehensive solutions beyond migrant worker dormitories in the fight against COVID-19.

"Looking back, it was an uncertain period for about 7 to 10 days, when the mission demands changed, on an almost-daily basis. But a clear Mission Analysis, as taught in the SAF Battle Procedure, allowed us to decide what needed to be done as a baseline, and what were the special-to-type arrangements which could only proceed after the decision on camp usage had been made. To me, it was a good example of the SAF's training coming to life, and being put into use in an operational setting."

BG Chua Jin Kiat
Commander EHTF

"We were faced with the massive task of stemming the spread of COVID-19 in the migrant worker dormitories while caring for them and supporting them, so we had to move fast. We relied on mechanisms that have served us well over the years and applied their principles to the new mission. We forged cohesive teams across organisational and cultural lines. And we adapted to challenges even as they evolved."

BG Seet Uei Lim
Commander JTF(A)