Chapter 1: The virus hits

Introduction

It was January 2020, and the “novel coronavirus” had arrived in Singapore. Before long, the threat had a name — the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused by the SARS-COV- 2 virus. But the experts still had little understanding of this new threat. There was hope that the outbreak would be short-lived, like the previous serious coronavirus outbreak SARS had been in 2003. That turned out to be a false hope. It soon became clear that COVID-19 was spreading fast across just about every country and posing a very grave public health threat across the world. It was a global pandemic.

In Singapore, as the nature and magnitude of the threat became clearer, Singaporeans had to adopt new habits to safeguard their health. Government organisations as well as those in the private and people sectors had to develop new processes and procedures to ensure that they could continue to function while keeping their people safe.

Priorities

The mission was clear. The Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) had to remain operationally ready with no compromise to its ability to protect Singapore and Singaporeans even as it supported Whole-of-Government (WoG) efforts to fight COVID-19, all while protecting the health of every soldier, sailor, and airman. The SAF had to be ready and able to take on new tasks in support of the national effort against the disease, all without letting up on its current operations and force-generation activities. The scale of the mission was daunting.

Fortunately, the SAF was not starting from a blank slate. The Joint Operations Department (JOD) team, led by Director of Joint Operations (DJO) BG David Neo, could draw on the research from local and foreign health agencies to quickly develop some understanding of the virus, even though there was still much that was uncertain at that time. The SAF could also draw on its experiences with SARS in 2003 and the H1N1 swine flu in 2009 to develop operational responses to this new virus.

Lessons learnt from the SARS experience in 2003 and established baseline pandemic preventive measures such as implementing cohorting practices and donning Personal Protective Equipment.

Source: Reuters/ Mr David Loh

The SAF was also fortunate to have many experienced officers in the Ops community who had run SAF operations during those outbreaks, and could draw upon their expertise. Moreover, the community had worked closely together on several operations recently, including the drone disruptions at Changi Airport and the maritime incursions off Tuas, and there was a strong sense of camaraderie.

So, the SAF was able to act decisively and quickly implement measures to stem the spread of COVID-19 among its personnel. JOD also worked closely together with the Services' Operations Departments to roll out measures across the SAF. Safe management measures (SMM), such as operating in smaller groups, taking temperatures regularly, and practising more rigorous hygiene habits, were quickly rolled out even as more preparations were being made.

Temperature checking regime implemented even while doctors and scientists were still trying to figure out the nature of the COVID-19 virus.

Source: MINDEF

A top priority was to ensure that the SAF could continue to carry out its core defence and security mission effectively. Cohorting was implemented at the start, so that the identified Critical Ops Units (COUs) could continue to stand ready to defend Singapore. The growing COVID-19 numbers, however, forced the SAF to adopt tighter measures. A particularly important one was to impose a pre-deployment isolation period to ensure that the COUs would be free of COVID-19. While this gave the SAF the assurance that operations could continue, it was onerous for the service members involved.

Once the posture for COUs was determined, the Ops community had to adjust the pace and modality of training that was less time-sensitive, especially after the nationwide “Circuit Breaker” was imposed. JOD coordinated with the Services to categorise the different activities across the SAF, and scaled back on as many less essential activities as possible.

RSAF personnel on an air surveillance mission using the Heron 1 UAV.

RSN personnel carrying out maritime security operations.

Soldiers conducting homeland security operations.

Source: MINDEF

At Joint Staff Conferences, Chief of Defence Force (CDF) LG Melvyn Ong and the Service Chiefs deliberated extensively to make hard decisions, such as whether to suspend In- Camp Training (ICT) in alignment with national workplace measures, and whether it was necessary to take the radical step of developing home-based learning modules for Basic Military Training (BMT) during the “Circuit Breaker”.

These decisions were taken with an eye on the trade-offs: the effectiveness of training would be affected, but decisive and calibrated steps were necessary if the SAF was to be able to remain operationally ready without compromising the health of its personnel.

Adapting

Even as these measures were being developed and implemented quickly, the SAF continued to draw on information coming in from its own units and partners in other organisations in Singapore to adjust its policies. As the Ministry of Health (MOH) learnt more about COVID-19 and updated its guidance, the SAF made the necessary adjustments.

The SAF also tapped on the experience of international partners. BG Neo held regular video conferences with counterparts such as LG John Frewen, Commander of Australia's Defence COVID-19 Task Force, and MG Tiopan Aritonang, Director of Operations in the Indonesian Armed Forces Joint Staff, to share best practices and learn from one another. As these armed forces were, like the SAF, constantly having to adapt to COVID-19, learning from their experiences helped the SAF in developing useful and sensible ways to adapt training policies.

BG David Neo speaking to Director General of Health Services LG Dato' Pahlawan (Dr) Md Amin bin Muslan and Deputy Inspector General BG Hj Anas bin Hj Hassan from the Malaysian Armed Forces (on screen).

Source: MINDEF

With the early successes in dealing with COVID-19 within the military and a growing understanding of the virus, the SAF was able to make two key adjustments. First, it quickly moved to exploit data analytics to track the transmission and spread of COVID-19 within the SAF and also to support the work of the various SAF Task Forces which had been set up to combat COVID-19. With rigorous analysis of the available data, the SAF became more targeted and effective in contact tracing, which helped to slow the spread.

Second, the SAF exploited technology and tapped on the Defence Technology Community (DTC) as a force multiplier. One of the first phone calls JOD received during the pandemic was from Ms Ngiam Le Na, Deputy Chief Executive (Operations) of Defence Science and Technology Agency (DSTA), offering the DTC's assistance. Within hours, a team of DSTA engineers and DSO National Laboratories (DSO) scientists joined the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF)-SAF Operations Centre, to solve problems alongside SAF officers.

The close partnership of Ops and Tech communities, with DTC engineers and scientists working in lockstep with the SAF as an integral part of the team, would characterise the SAF's approach in every WoG Task Force that it was asked to lead or contribute to. This close ops-tech partnership enabled the SAF to exploit relevant technology to achieve better operational outcomes in its fight against COVID-19.

DSTA engineer providing support to SAF personnel who assisted MOH in contact tracing.

Source: MINDEF

A quick and early payoff came with the roll-out of the pulse oximeter once it was established that there was a correlation between the blood oxygen level and severity of COVID-19. As this humble device could give an early indicator that a patient's condition was at risk of deteriorating rapidly, it enabled the SAF to take quick medical action to keep its people safe.

Overcoming challenges

While the SAF found ways and means to adapt and remain effective, the battle against the virus was not an easy one because of the virus's ever-changing nature. But BG Neo was confident that the SAF, with its ability to sense-make and stay nimble, would have an edge against this constantly evolving “enemy”.

Operating amidst significant uncertainty, the SAF developed new plans and measures anchored on data and empirical evidence to stay effective; it was in the military's DNA to always be prepared. Many ground commanders ran table-top exercises to stress-test contingency plans against a range of COVID-19 scenarios. This enabled the SAF to act quickly and decisively whenever positive cases emerged among service personnel, sometimes even before the health agencies had decided on what course of action to take. In fact, when the first case emerged in the SAF in February 2020, JOD was ready to respond with measures developed by the SAF to mitigate the spread of the disease, which went beyond the national guidance at the time.

SAF personnel in COUs, like SSG Loh Yong Han, 2IC of an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Section, isolated in camp before performing their operational duties.

Source: MINDEF

Equally, if not more important, was the commitment of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Right from the beginning, the SAF leadership had emphasised the importance of good communication along the command chain and the need to keep every serviceman and servicewoman up to date on what the SAF was doing in its fight against COVID-19. This not only helped to keep all our people engaged but also highlighted to them the important roles that they played, both individually and collectively.

Chief of Army (COA) MG Goh Si Hou engaging recruits at Basic Military Training Centre (BMTC).

Source: MINDEF

There was also a culture shift, as the SAF encouraged our people to develop socially responsible behaviours, such as seeking medical attention early and staying at home for suspected illnesses.

The impending surge

Throughout this period, while the SAF worked hard to manage the COVID-19 situation within the military, the situation in Singapore was worsening. The invisible enemy had breached Singapore's borders and the capacity of the healthcare agencies was severely strained, with healthcare workers having to work very long hours to stem the tide. The Government knew that Singapore had a wicked problem on its hands that would require organisation on a large scale to deal with the increasing number of cases.

In the months that followed, the SAF would be called upon to develop crisis management strategies with WoG partners, support national healthcare and lead assurance operations, and overcome tactical challenges on the ground. The ability of its service personnel to lead at the strategic, operational and tactical levels would be put to the test.

Locally transmitted and imported cases in Singapore from Jan to Mar 2020

Bar graph showing total COVID-19 cases for January to March, with locally transmitted and imported cases indicated.