Chapter 8: Command in a complex environment

Illustration: Mr Lee Xin Li

Introduction

Less than three months after COVID-19 appeared in Singapore, after about 2,500 cases, the Government imposed the “Circuit Breaker” on 7 April 2020. Shortly after, the first confirmed case in an SAF combat unit surfaced. Vaccinations were still over half a year away and Antigen Rapid Testing was not yet available.

COVID-19 positive! What do we do now?

It was a Sunday and LTC Michael Enriquez, CO of 2 SIR, was enjoying time with his family. Until his phone rang. It was CPT Zimmer Chong, his Officer Commanding (OC) of Support Company. “Sir, we have a situation. PTE “A” from Mortar Platoon just tested PCR Positive!” The words rang in LTC Enriquez's ears. After asking about "A's" condition, he told CPT Chong, “We have no time to lose. Get the details and push up an incident report.” “Already on it, Sir,” CPT Chong replied.

LTC Enriquez quickly called MAJ Ian Vanderput, his Operations Officer. He was thinking, “Hell! I haven't heard of a COVID case in a combat unit in the SAF yet. Is this the first one?” Then - “It's Sunday! The battalion is booking in tonight!” The thought made his stomach churn. But before he could dwell on it, MAJ Vanderput's voice came over the line. “Ian, it's CO. We've got a COVID-19 case in Support Company. Here's what I need you to do.”

This is what we do

LTC Enriquez hurried back to camp to meet with his Battalion core group. His first priority was to determine the extent of infection in the battalion, and stem any panic or speculation among the troopers. Thankfully, an earlier Formation Executive Group meeting chaired by Commander, 3 Div BG Frederick Choo had already decided to allocate resources from across the Army to help units with consequence management. LTC Enriquez had registered his requests then, as well as through his direct superior, Commander, 3rd Singapore Infantry Brigade (SIB) COL Wong Shi Ming.

LTC Enriquez's first order of business was to carry out contact tracing. 2 SIR was supported by the SAF's Contact Tracing Centre (CTC). CTC had been set up to support the national contact tracing efforts, and LTC Enriquez was glad that the Army had now allocated dedicated contact tracing capacity to his unit.

However, he also knew that his troopers might be alarmed if they received a call directly from CTC. Some of them had already headed to the NCID on their own accord after hearing that PTE “A” was infected with COVID-19. Pushing out timely and accurate information to his troopers and their families would have to be the next priority.

While he had Army Information Centre (AIC)'s key messages prepared for such situations, LTC Enriquez knew they had to be tailored to sound more engaging and less formal for the situation at hand. So he tasked his OCs and Company Sergeant Majors (CSMs) to synchronise key communications lines and disseminate them across the battalion. As for the soldiers identified as close contacts of PTE “A”, LTC Enriquez instructed CPT Chong and his CSM 3WO Desmond Xie to speak to them immediately, before CTC contacted them. “It's important that your troopers hear from you first,” LTC Enriquez told CPT Chong.

HQ Army Medical Services (HQ AMS) also responded to LTC Enriquez's request for medical support. To give greater assurance, SAF Medical Officers (MOs) were deployed to swab all 29 close contacts in their homes that same day and they were told to stay home until their swab results cleared them. The next day, after the rest of the battalion had booked in, HQ AMS deployed MOs to 2 SIR to do medical screening for the entire battalion. Anyone with flu-like symptoms was immediately swabbed and isolated. Those who reported sick that morning were seen by the MOs at the battalion instead of Kranji Camp Medical Centre, which was the norm, to reduce the risk of further infection.

SAF Medical Officers were deployed to swab all 29 close contacts in their homes that same day and they were told to stay home until their swab results cleared them.

Illustration: Mr Lee Xin Li

We take off on 48 hours

It was 15 August 2021, and the fall of Afghanistan's capital Kabul to the Taliban sent shockwaves around the globe. When Vice President of the United States (US) Ms Kamala Harris visited Singapore a week later, Prime Minister Mr Lee Hsien Loong offered the US one of the RSAF's aircraft to assist with the evacuation of those stranded in Afghanistan.

LTC “W” was a Branch Head at Air Plans Department and had been CO 112 Squadron — home of the RSAF's newly operationalised A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) — before that. He received a text from the Campaign HQ informing him that he had been nominated National Contingent Commander for in-theatre operations. And he had only 48 hours to assemble the team and logistics for the mission. While LTC “W” knew that the mission was urgent, he had not expected the deployment to be so immediate. He had to coordinate the mission details with the Americans, run through the operational schedule and security plans, and assemble the task force immediately. Together with the current CO 112 Squadron LTC “C”, LTC “W” began to gather the people he needed to make the mission a success. As a former CO, he was confident that the subject matter experts could be counted on to formulate the plans.

Illustration: Mr Lee Xin Li

Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen, with CDF LG Melvyn Ong and Chief of Air Force MG Kelvin Khong, meeting SAF personnel before their deployment to support the Afghanistan evacuation operations.
Source: MINDEF

From take-off to touchdown

LTC “W” knew that his team would face many challenges in this mission. First, there was no established liaison contact in-theatre. The situation in Kabul was in flux and in the midst of all the complexities, the team had to find a way to fit seamlessly into the US' operations. Second, this was going to be the squadron's first Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation since attaining Full Operational Capability. Third, the envisaged 22 hours of daily operations would definitely push the personnel and aircraft to the limit. Finally, there was the challenge of keeping the team members COVID-free while ensuring that the mission was executed effectively and efficiently.

After a quick huddle with LTC “C” and the other team leaders, LTC “W” made a mental list of the key issues: logistics, threat assessment, base security, COVID-19 measures, route planning, and operational contingencies. So much to do, but so little time. There was only one way to get this done - prioritise, and empower the team to decide and execute their tasks according to the mission's intent ¹. The team pointed out that they could not drill down to the level of detail they wanted for some of the contingencies. But the team leaders understood that the priority was to deploy quickly. As for the rest, they would just have to figure out potential show-stoppers and settle the details when they were in-theatre.

Shortly after take-off, LTC “W” made it clear to everyone what they had to accomplish over the next few days and went through the contingency plans. “Our aim is to safely evacuate the refugees, with no COVID-19 and security incidents. The situation is dynamic and plans will change. But be comfortable with uncertainty. Keep the aim in mind and fall back on your fundamentals and operational experience.” The team was tired from the hectic preparations but they were fuelled by their sense of mission and purpose ². The team members were mostly volunteers and LTC “W” knew they were raring to go.

¹ Leading in SAF 2040
Mission Command Thinking is a command or leadership philosophy which may enable and empower our leaders for sense-making and decision-making in complexity. Click here (https://www.mindef.gov.sg/staticfile/covid19/saf-2040.html) to read more about Sense-making and Decision-making in Complexity and the other Leadership Development 2040 focus areas.

² SAF Leadership 24/7
A good understanding and appreciation of the SAF's Mission and Purpose is fundamental to effective leadership. Click here to find out more about the fundamental building blocks of leadership, and the context of leadership in the SAF.

The RSAF's A330 MRTT - a fuel tanker that can also be configured for aeromedical evacuation.
Source: MINDEF

Before LTC “W” could get some shut-eye, it was time to prepare for landing at Al-Udeid Air Base in Qatar. But the base was full, so the landing had to be delayed by three hours. Jet-lagged, LTC ”W” and his team split up and went to look for their liaison officers and logistics. Everyone sprang into action: the logistics team had to refuel the aircraft as quickly as possible, the Army personnel had to kit up and prepare to screen the first load of evacuees, the pilots had to prepare the flight route for the next leg to Germany, and the Air Refuelling Operator had to prepare the cabin to receive the first load of evacuees. LTC “W” had to figure out how to integrate the SAF's operations with the US'. There was much to sort out, but he was confident that the mission was in good hands because of his team members' expertise and clear sense of mission.

Balancing between operating by instructions and operating by intent

The challenge of uncertainty which both LTC Enriquez and LTC “W” faced is something many commanders in the SAF can relate to. They know too well the perpetual tension between issuing precise instructions and the alternative of empowering lower echelons of command to make decisions appropriate to the situation at hand. The latter approach is known as Mission Command. Commanding by instruction, in which clear and to-the-letter instructions are given, leaves little room for subordinate initiative and may be criticised as micro-managing. While commanding by intent may seem a more enlightened approach, the commander has to loosen his control, which entails a degree of risk-taking and deep trust among the team members. The question is whether one approach is superior to the other or there should be a balance between the two approaches. There is also the question of whether the context should matter greatly when deciding on the approach to take.

Is Mission Command the answer?

Warfare is a dynamic and unpredictable affair. As the saying goes, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. Some modern approaches to warfare have thus emphasised commanding by intent rather than commanding by instruction, so that forces are agile enough to adapt to changing conditions. But organising for Mission Command may not come naturally in the military. Militaries are by their very nature detail-oriented and precise organisations, optimised for an anticipated task. So, even as militaries may see the usefulness of a more decentralised approach to command, there are cultural and structural impediments that may hamper this shift.

Any effort to shift towards Mission Command can also be complicated by technological advances in communications which enable better Command and Control (C2) of forces, thus allowing commanders at the highest echelons to observe and direct missions at the tactical level. This may lead to the conclusion that there is less need to apply Mission Command, and encourage an organisation's tendency to centralise decisions, information, and resources in the name of maximising efficiencies and minimising risks. As the SAF pursues new technologies and builds the next generation of networks and sensors, it is useful to reflect on the balance between centralisation and decentralisation. Do more powerful information resources mean that the centre is the best place for decision-making? Or could decentralised access to the same information enable not only more agile but also better decisions on the ground?

The essence of Mission Command.
Source: Sparks Consulting LLC

As a command approach that focuses on subordinate empowerment to make decentralised decisions, Mission Command is premised on the view that there can be no perfect plan. Especially in situations fraught with uncertainty, what is critical to success is agility and responsiveness. With centralised authority, there may be delay and the risk of misinterpreting the ground situation. The Mission Command approach emphasises trust in subordinate echelons' assessment and initiative. What is key is a clear articulation of the commander's intent to ensure alignment across the unit.

Eight principles of Mission Command

Source: Mission Command: Applying a military leadership philosophy to high-performance teams (Peter David, Kearny, 2021).

These eight principles of Mission Command which Peter David of business consultancy Kearney drew up to guide business teams originated from the military. What stands out is that effective Mission Command in any organisation requires more than just C2 doctrines and systems. It is difficult to imagine an organisation applying Mission Command effectively unless there is a significant cultural and mindset shift that has permeated through the organisation.

Genesis of Mission Command

The Mission Command concept originated from the Prussian Army in the 19th Century when the concept of Auftragstaktik (mission tactics) emerged in response to the expanded volume, speed and reach of combat operations, and the introduction of more lethal and longer range weapons. Prussian commanders found that they could no longer maintain direct situation awareness or exert direct command over their forces.

So the Prussian General Staff identified the need to encourage flexibility and independent action at lower levels of command so that they could still operate effectively on the battlefield. Their solution was to introduce “mission-type orders” which focused on outcomes rather than tasks - the what to be done rather than the how to do it. This would allow subordinate commanders maximum flexibility to achieve their commander's intent even when they did not receive instructions.

Contemporary application of Mission Command

One of the more popular case studies of Mission Command in recent military history is that described by General Stanley McChrystal in his book, Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World. McChrystal tells a story of how the well-equipped and well-trained Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq struggled to defeat the Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) insurgency network. In McChrystal's view, the key problem was that the operating environment had shifted decisively from one that his 20th Century military outfit was designed for, to one that was defined by 21st Century internet, social, and organisational networking.

McChrystal's approach to reorganising the Task Force took lessons from Mission Command. His key intervention lay not in the manoeuvre on the battlefield, but in a restructuring that leveraged on his staff's and commanders' “competence and adaptability”. He focused on building the necessary structures and culture that would allow the Task Force to respond quickly and adaptively in a complex and uncertain operating environment. Among other things, he instituted daily Operations and Intelligence briefs, which provided a structure around which the Task Force's various entities could share information and improve collective situational awareness. He created liaisons between sub-units to encourage closer cooperation and sharing. These structures engendered greater trust and built shared understanding.

From command to team of teams

Source: Readingraphics.com

These formed the foundations for what McChrystal called the “Team of Teams”. They provided a bottom-up view of how team members would experience Mission Command culture. McChrystal added that in order to enable this culture to work, the mindset should be to empower teams closest to the problems, as they were in the best position to decide and act decisively.

The key words that McChrystal used are familiar. It is clear that Mission Command is indeed alive and relevant in the 21st Century. Leaders of modern Mission Command can see themselves as shepherds, whose job is to create the best environment possible for their flock to grow and flourish.

A lesson from radio silence

Writing in 2017, a young British infantry officer reflected on his experience during field training when he drew valuable lessons on Mission Command. During the Russian invasion leading to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, a Ukrainian mechanised column of over 100 vehicles had been destroyed by rocket fire within three minutes. It was suspected that the Russians had signals intelligence to target the column. Because of such a potential threat, his unit had observed radio silence in their field training.

Radio communications can be intercepted and exploited by adversaries.

The officer lamented that while his unit performed well in the first iteration of the scenario, the forces tasked with conducting an anti-armour ambush had engaged a lone vehicle prematurely, leaving the larger armoured column that came later untouched. He realised that “radios had made me lazy in my briefing because I knew I could control it well during the action.” His operations orders had lacked key pieces of information which his unit, with radio silence, needed to make informed decisions.

Adapting from the first exercise, he set about improving his orders. This time, he made his intent clear and specified contingency plans to guide subordinate actions when they did not get orders. He observed that his junior commanders took more initiative and made sound decisions even though they did not have central direction during the mission. He concluded that his subordinates were in fact “incredibly intelligent, capable soldiers who, when empowered (and) given a clear intent and detailed set of constraints, can be released on task and will carry it out to a high standard without further direction.”

The experience of this officer in an imposed radio silence clearly benefited him, and he leaves us with an interesting question the next time we as leaders reach out to our teammates: “Am I asking questions because I need to or because I can?”

Reflection — Does the SAF's conduct of peacetime operations, peacetime administration, and wargaming/exercises support Mission Command and radio silence?

Lessons learnt

Working with uncertainty

“The greatest challenge in the entire episode was dealing with uncertainty,” reflected LTC Enriquez, “especially given that this was the first COVID-19 case in a combat unit in the SAF. I told the battalion that the only thing more scary than the virus was fear itself.” In a similar vein, LTC “W” said that “being comfortable with uncertainty and being able to nimbly adapt as conditions changed” helped the team navigate through the multitude of unknowns during their in-theatre operations.

LTC Enriquez knew that it was important, when managing a crisis, not to lose sight of the fundamentals. COVID-19 or not, the battalion still had important training objectives to meet. “The support from CTC, HQ AMS, and AIC was critical in giving us and our troopers the confidence to resume training, being assured that our battalion was 'clean'.” LTC Enriquez also greatly appreciated that his superiors, BG Choo and COL Wong, had given his team the space to manage the situation while ensuring that the battalion had the resources for consequence management.

Mission Command: The art of empowerment

Faced with situations in a state of flux, both LTC Enriquez and LTC “W” had quickly given their ground commanders and team leads the flexibility to make decisions on the ground. There was no time to wait for instructions. At the same time, both commanders made sure that they issued clear mission orders. For LTC Enriquez, it was to contain the spread beyond the index case, keep the soldiers calm, and resume regular training as soon as possible. In LTC “W”'s case, it was to safely evacuate the refugees with no COVID-19 or security incidents.

With the resources offered by the Army, each OC at 2 SIR operated independently to oversee contact tracing, disseminate information from the battalion HQ, and ensure safe management of training. There was simply no time for the CO to micro-manage. “I gave the OCs space to manage their companies, but set clear limits and deliverables like hourly reports to update battalion HQ. Each company appointed a liaison officer to communicate with HQ, so that the OCs would have the bandwidth to manage their companies.”

Similarly, at Al-Udeid and Ramstein Air Base in Germany, LTC “W”'s teams had to profile the refugees, deal with ad-hoc base closures, draw up safety and security management plans for the crew and refugees, and coordinate with international officers on various logistics and operational demands. With the situation changing rapidly, he had to leave it to the team leads and give them the necessary information and space to adjust the plans as the situation required. Like LTC Enriquez, LTC “W” set clear boundaries and deliverables, including calling for ad-hoc debriefs at the end of each mission so that improvements could be made in the next run.

Trust as a key ingredient

The mutual trust between commanders and their men was clear and everything went smoothly. For LTC Enriquez, it was business as usual except for Support Company, as the rest of the battalion resumed normal training with necessary SMM in place. As for LTC “W”, he trusted that his crew had COVID-proofed the plane and transit areas as much as possible, and had drawn up the necessary plans for processing the refugees.

As LTC Enriquez said, “The key ingredient for our success was the trust among our team. We trusted that our commanders could operate independently and update battalion HQ when necessary, and we trusted that every soldier was complying with the established SMM. The trust of our soldiers that the battalion was doing everything possible to protect them against infection, even as we continued training, was especially important. The men were very concerned, but the moment they were informed that there were doctors deployed for swab operations and medical screening, they were much more assured.”

LTC Enriquez frequently engaged his battalion, believing that open communication would help to build trust and empower his soldiers.
Source: MINDEF

These investments in consequence management paid dividends for 2 SIR. LTC Enriquez was heartened and proud to see that all close contacts of PTE “A” returned the following week for Section Field Camp. As for LTC “W”'s mission, all assigned refugees were safely evacuated to Germany, there was no COVID incident, and the mission crew returned to Singapore safely.

Both LTC Enriquez and LTC “W” had successfully led their teams through uncertain and fast-moving situations. Being closest to the ground, they best understood the conditions and how best to respond as the conditions evolved. Just as they gave their teams the leeway to make decisions as the situation demanded, their higher HQ elements gave them the space to operate without micro-managing them while making sure that they were provided with the resources they needed. This approach echoed the principles of Mission Command, and enabled effective responses in both situations.

Applying Mission Command in the SAF

There will be greater complexity and uncertainty in our operating environment. That is a given. With that in mind, how can the SAF best apply the concepts of Mission Command? The following three points are worth thinking about.

First, Mission Command generally applies to direct leadership, but the SAF should also consider how it can be applied at the organisational level. Are there areas or situations where we can articulate broad policy intent and delegate decision-making to lower echelons of command? Could this cut red tape and save manpower and time?

Second, in applying Mission Command to our everyday work, commanders could consider setting up task-oriented focus groups comprising personnel of relevant appointments and expertise. These could be along the lines of the daily Operations and Intelligence meetings convened by General McChrystal. Structure can drive behaviour, and pulling together the right people can be a useful first step to developing more independence and autonomy at lower levels of command.

Third, commanders must be judicious about where and when to apply the concept of Mission Command. Centralised command and emphasis on rote drills have a place in the military when dealing with situations which are high-risk and highly volatile and which demand immediate action. But it is also in high-risk and highly volatile situations where immediate action is required that Mission Command may be useful, because centralisation could inhibit agile adaptation. It is important to recognise that not every situation demands decentralised command.

The challenges faced by the SAF during the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted how a decentralised Mission Command approach can be helpful to commanders when they have to respond effectively in a fast-changing and uncertain operating environment. It is not only in the battlefield that the SAF will have to operate in such an environment but even in our day-to-day operations, as our experience during the pandemic reminded us. As commanders, we have to appropriately infuse these concepts into our approaches to command.